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Leo Bersani and
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Over the past twenty-five years,
while formulating a series of influential theses about sex, Leo Bersani
has also been methodically working through a philosophy of art.
This, of course, is no big secret;
the subtitle of The Freudian Body
(1986), after all, is Psychoanalysis
and Art, and much of Bersani’s career has been dedicated to investigating the relation between these
two terms. From The Forms of Violence (1985) to Forms of Being
(2004), Bersani has always been a
formalist, though one for whom
the question of form is intimately
associated with questions of ethics
and ontology. In large part it is this
commitment to the aesthetic,
rather than more explicitly political concerns, that motivates the
rigorous refusal of redemption
that has been so influential in queer
studies. Bersani opposes, for instance, the seemingly benign tendency to view art as imparting
value on experience not only because this compensatory view
soothes the sting of injustice, but
also because it demotes art to an
unseemly subservience to a culture’s need for consolation. Art, for
Bersani, has its own value independently of these consolations—a
value worth defending.
But what is the nature of this
value? Given the masochistic aesthetic formulated in Bersani’s earlier works, we might expect a
number of answers to this question. We might anticipate, for in-
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stance, the hypothesis that art, like
sex, has the potential to overwhelm
the self and trigger experiences of
jouissance that disrupt the violent
hegemony of the ego. And indeed,
according to Bersani, art does offer
these sorts of experiences. Whereas
at one point in his career art came
to seem a lot like sex, however, his
later writings suggest that it is, on
the contrary, sex that begins to resemble art. “The aesthetic is not
confined to works of art,” he argues, “sex can also be one of the
modalities of the aesthetic” (70).
This seeming reversal of emphasis
suggests an attempt to rethink the
understanding of self-shattering
for which Bersani is most famous.
The result has been a criticism that
does not so much use psychoanalysis to read art, or even art to read
psychoanalysis (two projects that
he has executed brilliantly throughout his career), but rather that gestures toward evasions of the model
of subjectivity associated with psychoanalysis in the first place. For
some time now, Bersani has been
exploring the possibility that the
aesthetic might rewrite our understanding of subjectivity in a way
that precedes the sundry dramas of
aggression that Freud has taught
us to recognize.
What is striking about the development of Bersani’s thought is
not its commitment to the aesthetic, but rather the specific vision
of the aesthetic to which it is committed. The attempt to imagine
forms of relationality that sidestep

the violence inherent in the appetitive structure of selfhood has led
our most eloquent critic of the culture of redemption to a view of art
that appears surprisingly pastoral,
a view dedicated to discovering
our “at-homeness in the world”
(55, 119). For Bersani, art might
lead us “to see our prior presence
in the world, to see, as bizarre as
this may sound, that, ontologically,
the world cares for us” (152–53).
This aesthetic is a mode of interacting with the world that doesn’t
strive to master or obliterate otherness, but rather that accepts “the
pleasure of finding ourselves harbored within it” (153). We are both
in the world and of the world, and
it is one of the constitutive tragedies of human existence, Bersani
argues, that we find ourselves compelled to blot out this reality.
These ontological tendencies are
not a new development, but they
are underlined with particular elegance and force in Bersani’s recent
collection Is the Rectum a Grave?
and Other Essays. Or, rather, they
are underlined in the Other Essays
of the collection’s title. “Is the Rectum a Grave?” (1987), it would
seem, is among the least aesthetic
of Bersani’s writings, a landmark
work of cultural criticism dissecting both the affirmative shibboleths that would link sex and
progressive politics, on the one
hand, and the murderous misogyny and homophobia shaping the
cultural representation of the AIDS
crisis, on the other. The choice to
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jump-start Bersani’s recent collection with this famous essay—more
than a decade older than anything
else included—is one of the book’s
most interesting features. Besides
giving a new home to an immensely important journal article
(the piece actually began as a book
review), opening the new book
with “Is the Rectum a Grave?”
seems an attempt to recontextualize his insights about the antirelational solipsism of sex.
In the midst of one of two interesting interviews that close out the
volume, Kaja Silverman suggests
that it might be a mistake to read
Bersani’s later ideas about aesthetic
subjectivity as though they were
variations on his earlier work,
since the later work is chiefly interested in form. Bersani demurs,
however, responding: “What for
you is a reactive gesture is for me a
point of departure. . . . If there
weren’t pleasure in giving up what
our civilization insists we retain—
our ego boundaries—the communication of forms would never
occur. So masochism is the precondition of this passage” (175). In
other words, masochism is a precondition, a first step toward aesthetic communion. As such, the
“Rectum” essay is already a story
about form. Art and sex are important not only because they disrupt
the illusion of identity upon which
authority stakes its claims, but also
because they initiate a new mode
of perception once the ego’s cynosure is shaken. This point is made
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again and again throughout the
new collection such that it seems
impossible, after reading through
its essays and interviews in succession, to think of Bersani as a prophet
of negativity. Indeed, on a certain
level, it seems as though Bersani
takes the affirmative vision of sex
he has criticized so powerfully and
relocates it to a level of greater abstraction, offering an ontological
redemption rather than a merely
psychological one. “If our psychic
center can finally seem less seductive,” he argues, “it would seem
not only imperative but natural to
treat the outside as we would a
home” (70). Ultimately then, homoness winds up a surprising form
of cosmic hominess.
Despite the brilliance and coherence of the project revealed in
the new collection, the transposition of the “Rectum” essay into the
context of Bersani’s vision of the
aesthetic might generate a certain
cognitive dissonance, transposing
the essay from the context of the
urgency of the AIDS crisis to what
can seem like a diffuse mysticism.
In a sense, this shift might be seen
as paralleling the trajectory of queer
criticism more generally since the
1990s as drug treatments worked
to stanch, though not to stop, the
epidemic and the particular political exigencies shaping gay, lesbian,
and queer debate shifted. Though
Bersani’s continued antiredemptive commitments might make this
consonance seem unlikely, in fact
his vision of being harbored within
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the world’s care might be said to
resemble the reparative aesthetic
Eve Sedgwick identifies in the
work of Marcel Proust. “That the
universe along with the things in it
are alive and therefore good; here
I think, is the crux of Proust’s
mysticism,” she proposes, before
offering a qualification: “The formulation does not record a certainty or a belief but an orientation,
the structure of a need, and a mode
of perception. It is possible for the
universe to be dead and worthless;
but if it does not live, neither do
the things in it, including one’s self
and one’s contents. So put it comparatively: the universe itself is as
alive as anything it holds.”1 Despite
their differences, the career of both
thinkers follows a similar trajectory from a hermeneutics of sus
picion toward an exploration of
modes of perception that resituate
the self in relation to the world.
Both reveal a discontent with the
theoretical project of demystifying
power, as though this were all that
criticism could do, and a desire to
push theory toward experiences
that are hard to theorize, that appear themselves rather mystified.
For Sedgwick, of course, Proust’s
vision of systems nested within systems helps create more capacious
and habitable forms of interiority.
We long, she suggests, to be contained within a vital universe so
that we can value the things that
we contain ourselves. The upshot
is a prescription for how the self
might find forms of sustenance for

itself and its contents. What is potentially radical about Bersani’s
line of thought, on the other hand,
remains the possibility of love
without identity, a possibility that
itself hinges for Bersani on a particular notion of form. Although
he does continue to write about
Proust and Henry James, the novelists most important to Sedgwick’s
criticism, it is significant that his
imagination has come to gravitate
increasingly toward the visual arts.
One result of the transition is to
shift attention away from an art of
intricate interiors to a spatialized
aesthetic of repeating forms. Bersani’s space tends inevitably to extend and flatten; his preferred
spatial metaphors are figures of
contiguity and extension. Thus he
works to trace “the communication of forms in art as the affirmation of a certain solidarity in the
universe, a solidarity we must perhaps first of all see not as one of
identities but rather of positionings
and configurations in space” (43–
44, 100).
The solidarity Bersani discovers
within similarity resonates with
other projects such as Walter Benjamin’s writings on the mimetic
faculty and Maurice MerleauPonty’s on the flesh of the world.
But perhaps his aesthetic impersonality most resembles the forces
that drive mimicry in nature according to Roger Caillois, who, in
an essay that influenced Jacques
Lacan’s formulation of the mirror
stage, diagnosed a certain “deper-
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sonalization through assimilation
into space,” through which things
become “similar, not similar to
anything in particular, but simply
similar.”2 For Caillois, this tendency, through which an individual organism is driven to recede
into its environment, represents a
thirst to return to the inanimate
akin to the death drive. Bersani
likewise argues that the aesthetic
opens onto a mode of similitude
that differentiates neither between
the human and the nonhuman
nor even between the animate and
inanimate. In Bersani’s account,
however, making contact with this
sort of pervasive, impersonal similarity is connected with life rather
than death.
Self-shattering, in other words,
is rewritten as a form of expansiveness: “lessness,” we learn, “is the
condition of allness” (70). If such
allness escapes the label of redemption, it is because redemption is a
concept predicated on loss: something must be taken or traded
away in order to be redeemed. It is
just this fixation on lack that Bersani is working to avoid and that
propels his consideration of the
limits of psychoanalysis. Freud offers us powerful tools for tracing
the way the subject transforms the
world into its own reflection, for
the profound difficulty—if not the
impossibility—of relating to the
world at all. Art, on the other
hand, has the potential to demonstrate a truth that remains strangely
inadmissible: that relationality,
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rather than a problem, is simply
an ontological fact. The chief
stumbling block of psychoanalytic
thought, Bersani argues, “is the
difficulty it has imagining that we
can find ourselves already in the
world—there not as a result of our
projections but as a sign of the natural extensibility of all being. This
is the presence to which art—not
psychoanalysis—alerts us” (100).
Art, it seems, is better equipped
than theory to think about presence, to imagine subjectivity in
terms not of competition but of
composition. Bersani’s exploration
of this sort of aesthetic has no doubt
been nurtured by the methodology
of his investigations as much as by
his objects of study. For the most
part, his exploration of these questions has been produced in collaboration with Ulysses Dutoit, such
that the books and essays themselves render indistinguishable the
boundary between two different
voices, suggesting a sublunary version of the nonidentitarian communities they describe. At the
same time, however, even the fully
collaborative works are read in relation to what we might think of
Bersani’s author function, as testifying to the coherence of his
thought. Bersani admits, “[N]othing, it would seem, is more difficult than to conceive, to elaborate,
to put into practice ‘new relational
modes’ ” (102). The ambivalent
presence of the collaborative voice
within Is the Rectum a Grave?
points both toward the possibility
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of these modes and toward the
difficulty of their achievement.
Rather than listing Dutoit as a coauthor of the entire volume, specific pages, generally those pages
containing meditations on films,
are singled out in footnotes. In a
sense, this has the effect of turning each argument into a choreographed exchange between the
theorist, eager to secure distinctions, master difference, and correct mistakes, and an aesthetic
subject for whom boundaries fade
and are replaced by meditations
on likeness and presence rooted
in readings of specific works of
art.
One is struck by the regularity
with which this choreography unfolds. The collection seems to circle
back on itself, covering what appears to be the same territory again
and again. Bersani wants to loosen
the hold of a way of thinking in
thrall to difference by instituting a
thought organized around nonidentical sameness. In the process,
he produces his own thesaurus of
similarity, trying out a string of
nearly synonymous terms in order
to gesture toward the way of relating he catches glimpses of in the
works he studies: homoness, inaccurate replication, communication
of forms, similitude, infinite extensibility, alikeness, and so on.
Though each term has its nuances,
and their resemblance is of course
Bersani’s point, it’s difficult nonetheless not to find them weighted
down by a certain redundancy. In-

deed, the whole collection testifies,
in ways that are at once fascinating
and infuriating, to the sorts of mimetic echoes he teaches us to find
everywhere. What is frustrating is
that the aesthetic subjectivity he
outlines threatens to render the
universe into a sort of conceptual
gray goo of sameness. Whether the
artwork that spurs Bersani’s brilliant interpretation is a film by
Jean-Luc Godard or Pedro Almodóvar or a novel by Pierre Michon, the result is, if not identical,
profoundly similar. Indeed, entire
sequences of sentences are recycled
verbatim in multiple essays. Of
course, such repetitions have pragmatic explanations linked to the
assembly of occasional writings
into a collection such as this, but it’s
hard not to see them as both miming Bersani’s thesis and as symptomatic of it as well. Psychoanalysis
is, as Bersani has demonstrated
better than anyone, a profoundly
articulate discourse capable of endless nuance. One can’t help but feel
a little disappointed at finding,
when Bersani turns from the sexual to the aesthetic subject, that art,
rather than offering a more varied
and nuanced vision, offers a more
reductive one. That, even with
these reservations, one can still find
Bersani’s readings so brilliant and
pleasurable is a testament to his
own artistry.
Brian Glavey is an assistant professor of
English at the University of South Carolina.
He is at work on a book on modernism and
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queer aesthetics entitled “The Sissy Arts,”
portions of which have appeared in PMLA and
American Literature.
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